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Zoning-VIRGINIA DEFINES SCOPE OF LOCAL POWER TO IMPOSE DEDICATION
AND LAND USE REQUIREMENTS UPON INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNERS-Board of
Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
The power of local legislative bodies to enact zoning ordinances to regu-
late growth within their territorial jurisdictions has long been recognized.'
Pursuant to several enabling statutes,2 Virginia cities and counties have
chosen various means of implementing this regulatory authority.3 In re-
sponse to this trend, Virginia courts have developed general principles for
judicial review of zoning ordinances.' Simply stated, the purpose of a
zoning act must be to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare, to conserve and protect the value of buildings, and to encourage
the most appropriate use of the land.' If an area is zoned for other purposes
or if the locality is arbitrary or discriminatory in applying the ordinance,
the locality has exceeded the scope of the police power and the ordinance
or its application will be declared void. Zoning ordinances are presumed
1. The constitutionality of zoning ordinances was recognized by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court held
that zoning ordinances were a reasonable exercise of the police power and would be upheld
unless arbitrary or unreasonable, bearing no relationship to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. Accord, Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926), aff'd, 274 U.S.
603 (1927). For a general survey of land use law in Virginia see Note, Land Use Law in
Virginia, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 513 (1975).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-427 to -503 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3. See, e.g., RICHMOND, VA., CODE ch. 42 (1968); CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, VA., CODE ch. 17
(1960); Goochland County, Va., Zoning Ordinance, Dec. 1, 1965, as amended, Feb. 5, 1974.
4. The case which established the criteria used by the Virginia Supreme Court to evaluate
zoning ordinances was West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881,
appeal dismissed per curiam, 302 U.S. 658 (1937). In that case, appellant owned a clay pit in
a region which appellee zoned for residential use only. Appellant sought a rezoning of the area.
The court in upholding the city's action defined the power which a local government had in
zoning matters. The power was summarized in subsequent cases as follows:
The legislative branch of a local government in the exercise of its police power has
wide discretion in the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances. Its action is
presumed to be valid so long as it is not unreasonable and arbitrary. The burden of
proof is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that it bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.
Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 444, 211 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1975); Boggs v. Board
of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 490, 178 S.E.2d 508, 509-10 (1971); Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975) (denial of
request for higher density zoning was discriminatory); Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va.
488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971) (refusal to rezone was declared arbitrary and capricious); Board
of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (comprehensive ordinance unrea-
sonable and arbitrary).
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valid, the burden being placed upon the challenger of the ordinance to
show clearly its invalidity.' Under no circumstances may a locality, under
guise of the police power, impose arbitrary or unreasonable restraints upon
the use of private property.8
In Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,' the Virginia Supreme Court was asked
to affirm the invalidation of several provisions of a zoning ordinance
adopted by the James City County Board of Supervisors."0 Appellee
landowners contended that several sections of the ordinance denied equal
protection" and due process of law."2 The provisions attacked were those
providing a new classification for zoning districts, 3 large setback require-
7. The presumptive reasonableness must be challenged by probative evidence of unreason-
ableness. If the evidence of unreasonableness is sufficient to overcome the presumption, the
burden of producing evidence shifts to the locality which must produce further proof of
reasonableness or the ordinance will not be sustained. If evidence of reasonableness is suffi-
cient to make the question "fairly debatable," the ordinance must be sustained. If not, the
locality has failed in its burden and the ordinance will not stand. See City of Richmond v.
Randall, 215 Va. 506, 511, 211 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va.
434, 444-45, 211 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va.
655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974).
8. City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 209, 215, 1 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1939).
9. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
10. JAMES Crrv COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 20, art. 8A (1973). The trial court
granted complainants' motion for declaratory judgment, holding the ordinance deprived com-
plainants of reasonable use of their property without due process of law, discriminated against
property owners, and imposed unreasonable restrictions upon their land. Joint Appendix at
16, Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975). A motion for declaratory
judgment at law is a proper form of redress for an aggrieved landowner. Board of Supervisors
v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Board of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316,
106 S.E.2d 152 (1958). For the statute governing such procedure see VA. ConE ANN. § 8-578
(Repl. Vol. 1957). Since the original motion in Rowe included a request for injunctive relief,
this was a case in equity. An action for declaratory judgment may, however, be maintained
on either side of the court. Carr v. Union Church, 186 Va. 411, 42 S.E.2d 840 (1947).
11. A zoning ordinance, as any exercise of the state's police power, must conform to specific
provisions of the state and federal constitutions. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E.
516 (1925). When a landowner challenges an ordinance as arbitrary and unreasonable as
applied to him, he is alleging violation of the specific constitutional provision that "[n]o
state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAw & PRACTICE §§ 2-16 (3d ed. 1965).
12. A landowner challenging an ordinance on this basis is alleging that the zoning ordi-
nance, in "protecting" the public welfare, deprives him of the reasonable use of his land to
such an extent as to constitute a "taking" for public use without just compensation or due
process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. For a general discussion
of the constitutional scope of the zoning police power see 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE
§ 2 (3d ed. 1965).
13. The ordinance created a new district classification (the B-2 Business Tourist Entry
District) intended to encourage the most appropriate use of land, maintain the distinctive
historical character of the region, and encourage development of tourist facilities in an attrac-
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ments,' 4 minimum lot size,'5 and exclusion of several classifications by
commercial uses.'" Further, the landowners challenged the constitution-
ality7 of articles requiring as prerequisites to development the dedication
of land to the county for an access road (to be funded by the landowners)' 8
and review of architectural design.'9 The supreme court affirmed the inval-
idation of these provisions, declaring the entire ordinance void on its face.
The court reached its decision by examining three broad constitutional
issues: (1) whether application of a zoning classification to a single area,
to the exclusion of similar areas, denies equal protection; (2) whether dedi-
cation requirements violate due process guarantees; (3) to what extent
"use restrictions" may be imposed without violating due process and equal
protection. In examining the first of these issues, the court reaffirmed
established Virginia law that the arbitrary placing of boundary lines will
not invalidate a zoning ordinance.' The landowners argued the zoning
tive and harmonious manner. JAMES CITY COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 20, art. 8A
(1973).
14. Buildings were to be located no closer than 70 feet from the highway. Id. art. 8A-2.
15. For permitted uses, minimum lot area was 32,500 square feet. Id. art. 8A-3-1. Minimum
lot width was set at 150 feet, or 120 feet if the lot was in existence at the time the ordinance
was passed. Id. art. 8A-4.
16. Commercial property use was restricted to hotels, motels, service stations (with light
repairs under cover only), gift and antique shops, indoor theatres, art galleries, and restaur-
ants other than fast food establishments. Id. art. 8A-1-1 to -8.
17. See note 12 supra.
18. Fifty feet of the required setback was to be reserved for the construction of a public
access road in accordance with the applicable standards of the Virginia Department of High-
ways. JAMES CITY COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 20, art. 8A-2 (1973). The court in its
opinion treated the construction and maintenance requirements somewhat separately from
the land dedication requirements. However, since most authorities place both under the
general heading of "dedication," such will be the treatment in this note.
19. Architecture was to be approved by a design review board to ensure that all buildings
remained distinct from Colonial Williamsburg. Id. art. 8A-11.
20. 216 Va. at 148, 216 S.E.2d at 215. The appellants asked the court to retain those
portions of the ordinance not declared unconstitutional on the basis of a severability provision
adopted by the Board of Supervisors eight weeks after the start of the litigation. Id. at 147,
216 S.E.2d at 214. The court applied the test set forth in Hannabass v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
169 Va. 559, 194 S.E. 808 (1938). The determination as to the existence of a severability
provision turns on the intent of the lawmakers. Id. at 571, 194 S.E. at 813. The court held
that after the unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance were removed, its purpose and
spirit were destroyed and the remaining parts were mere appendages, wholly without func-
tion. 216 Va. at 148, 216 S.E.2d at 215.
21. This rule was set forth in West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192
S.E. 881, appeal dismissed per curiam, 302 U.S. 658 (1937), where the appellant claimed that
the lines of a residential zone had been arbitrarily drawn to include his business. In upholding
the ordinance the court said:
Necessarily any plan . . . must be in some degree arbitrary. It is seldom that there
is any definite reason for holding that a lot on one side of a line should be devoted to
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classification was arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to them, since
adjacent land was zoned differently." The court held, however, that while
the classification of adjacent property is a relevant consideration in the
evaluation of zoning ordinances, such areas may be zoned differently where
there is a rational basis.? Zoning classifications may not discriminate be-
tween landowners similarly situated, but a certain amount of arbitrariness
will be tolerated in the placement of district boundaries. 1 Unless specific
evidence is shown to the contrary, the different classification will continue
to enjoy its presumption of validity.?
Localities in Virginia have used various means to avoid growth pres-
sures. One means is to compel a developer to dedicate land for public
facilities as a condition precedent to development. 21 In Rowe, appellees'
attack on James City County's dedication requirement presented a case
of first impression in Virginia. The supreme court, limiting its opinion to
the facts of this case alone, held the property owners could not constitu-
tionally be compelled to dedicate land to the county as a condition preced-
ent to development.?
The court appears to have based its opinion on two concepts. First,
appellees were a collection of individual landowners, not a subdivider.?
one purpose and that just across it to another....
"The boundary line of a zoning district must be fixed in some locality. In the very
nature of things it must always be more or less arbitrary, because the property on one
side of a line cannot, in the very nature of things, be very different from the property
on the other side of the line." Id. at 283-84, 192 S.E. at 886, quoting from Inre Dawson,
136 Okla. 113, _ 277 P. 226, 228 (1929).
22. Adjacent property owned by Anheuser-Busch was zoned for manufacturing. Brief for
Appellees at 21, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
23. 216 Va. at 135, 216 S.E.2d at 206. See 8 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.61
(3d ed. 1965); 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE § 4-17 (3d ed. 1965).
24. West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 283-84, 192 S.E. 881, 886,
appeal dismissed per curiam, 302 U.S. 658 (1937).
25. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959);
County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 680, 44 S.E.2d 9, 11-12 (1947). In the presence of
such evidence, however, the court will invalidate a zoning classification. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 511-12, 211 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1975), where the court found
the classification of an area for single family dwellings unreasonable when placed between
two areas of heavy commercial development. In the Rowe case, the only evidence was that
adjacent property was zoned differently and that similar areas in the county had similar
traffic patterns.
26. Other methods used to control growth pressures include moratoriums on rezoning,
subdividing, issuance of building permits, and large lot zoning. Dolbeare, Mandatory Dedica-
tion of Public Sites as a Condition in the Subdivision Process in Virginia, 9 U. RICH. L. REv.
435 (1975).
27. 216 Va. at 138-39, 216 S.E.2d at 208-09.
28. The original complainants were 24 landowners owning a combined total of 59 parcels.
Joint Appendix at 1-2, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
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The court intimated that had the latter been true, VirginiL might have
joined the growing number of jurisdictions allowing such dedication re-
quirements. 9 Under Virginia's statutes, localities are granted the power to
enact ordinances regulating the development of subdivisions." Such ordi-
nances may include provisions providing for acceptance of dedications for
public streets, curbs, and other improvements." As a result, a strong argu-
ment may be made that municipalities could require mandatory dedica-
tions of subdividers pursuant to these regulatory powers.2 The court chose,
however, to leave the issue open, holding only that the statutes cannot
apply to individual landowners.33 As an alternative ground, enabling stat-
utes delegate no power to impose dedication requirements upon a devel-
oper, unless the need for such dedication arises out of public demand
generated by his development.3 Therefore, even if the landowner in Rowe
had been a subdivider, if his development did not generate a specific need
29. 216 Va. at 138, 216 S.E.2d at 208. "It is almost universally held that it is within the
police power of the state legislature to require such a voluntary donation." Frank Ansuini,
Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, -, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (1970); accord, Ayres v. City
Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n,
27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.
2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25,
394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
30. "The governing body of any county or municipality shall adopt an ordinance to assure
the orderly subdivision of land and its development." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-465 (Cum. Supp.
1975) (effective July 1, 1977), amending VA. ConE ANN. § 15.1-465 (Repl. Vol. 1973) (which
stated an ordinance "may" rather than "shall" be adopted).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(f) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Placing of public area designations
on a subdivision plat operates to transfer to the county in fee simple such premises. Id. § 15.1-
478.
32. 216 Va. at 137-38, 216 S.E.2d at 208.
33. Id.
34. Several jurisdictions have adopted this view, holding that any dedication requirement
must be specifically and uniquely attributable to the particular development. Pioneer Trust
& Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (school costs not caused
by subdivision but by entire community); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I.
63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970) (the need for percentage dedication requirement for recreation could
not be considered specifically attributible to a subdivider). Other jurisdictions hold the local-
ity's power to demand dedication does not exclusively depend on the use of facilities by
occupiers of the subdivision. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971) (dedication of
land, fees, or both for park purposes); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (dedication for school,
park, and recreational sites). For further discussion concerning the interpretations in other
jurisdictions see Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972). For possible effects of these approaches upon
Virginia law see Dolbeare, Mandatory Dedication of Public Sites as a Condition in the
Subdivision Process in Virginia, 9 U. RiCH. L. REv. 435 (1975).
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for a public dedication, none could be required.
Finally, the court evaluated the scope of a locality's authority to impose
specific restrictions upon the various uses of land. Landowners contended
the restrictions in the James City County Code effected a denial of due
process and equal protection. Localities have the statutory power to limit
construction in a zoning district,35 and the exercise of that power enjoys a
legislative presumption of validity which must be rebutted by probative
evidence of arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination." Significantly, the
court measured the ordinance's discriminatory results by considering its
collective effect upon all land in the district rather than its effect on each
individual landowner." In Rowe, the cumulative effect of lot restrictions
rendered 29% of the land undevelopable.3 8 Clearly this was an unreason-
able taking of property."
Likewise, the court concluded that a zoning classification cannot pro-
hibit or restrict certain uses and permit other uses where there is no valid
basis reasonably related to the police power for distinguishing between
them." In the Rowe case, the court concluded the distinctions made" were
completely artificial and not related to any proper exercise of the police
power." Where there is no evidence that a use will be "noxious, dangerous,
35. Local governing bodies may adopt ordinances to "restrict, permit, prohibit, and deter-
mine . . . [t]he areas and dimensions of land, water, and air space to be occupied by
buildings, structures and uses ...... VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The court
has repeatedly recognized the authority of local governments to adopt setback line restric-
tions. French v. Town of Clintwood, 203 Va. 562, 125 S.E.2d 798 (1962); Nusbaum v. City of
Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 145 S.E. 257 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926),
aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
36. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
37. This approach arguably distinguishes the rule of interpretation set forth in County of
Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947). In that case, the complainant asserted that
a zoning ordinance deprived all property owners within the county of their rights. The court
held, however, that a landowner attacking the ordinance could assert only the harm done to
his interests, not that done to others. Id. at 680, 44 S.E.2d at 11. In Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959), the court said that the welfare of all persons within
a zoned district was to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance.
Id. at 662, 107 S.E.2d at 396-97.
38. 216 Va. at 141, 216 S.E.2d at 210. The market value of the land rendered undevelopable
was $1,959,167.35. Id.
39. See note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
40. 216 Va. at 143, 216 S.E.2d at 212.
41. Hotels, motels, and theatres were permitted; banks, office buildings, and grocery stores
were prohibited. Antique shops were permitted, but shops selling antique reproductions were
prohibited. Restaurants were allowed; fast food or drive-in restaurants were not. Id.
42. Other jurisdictions have split on whether such distinctions between forms of uses can
be made. See, e.g., Frost v. Glen Ellyn, 30 Ill. 2d 241, 195 N.E.2d 616 (1964) (exclusion of a
drive-in restaurant from a business zone is unreasonable). Contra, Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Idaho
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or otherwise inimical to the public health, safety, and welfare"43 it may not
be excluded.
In addition to commercial restrictions, land use limitations included
permissible types of architecture. Landowners were prohibited from build-
ing upon their parcels until architectural form was approved by a design
review board.4 Such restraint, the court held, was not within the statutory
power of the county to create a "convenient, attractive and harmonious
community. 4 5 The legislature's grant of power to harmonize communities
did not include limiting the use of property solely on the basis of aesthetic
considerations.46 While aesthetics is a relevant consideration to be weighed
in the drafting of a zoning ordinance, other elements of the police power
must also be present and controlling." Incidental presence of other pur-
poses promoting the public health, safety and welfare will not validate an
ordinance when it appears that its primary scope is aesthetically oriented. 8
In Rowe, the supreme court redefined the power of localities in Virginia
to regulate growth and development through zoning ordinances. Zoning
classifications continue to enjoy a presumption of validity by the courts.
Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968) (there is a distinction between drive-ins and full
service restaurants for zoning purposes). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 989 (1962) for a discus-
sion of the zoning of fast food establishments.
43. 216 Va. at 144, 216 S.E.2d at 212. See also County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675,
688, 44 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1947) (upholding a use restriction against a commercial junkyard within
a residential district); Cherrydale Cement Block Co. v. County Bd., 180 Va. 443, 23 S.E.2d
158 (1942) (exclusion of industrial plant from residential area upheld); West Bros. Brick Co.
v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881, appeal dismissed per curiam, 302 U.S. 658
(1937) (brick pit exclusion from residential district held valid).
44. See note 19 supra.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
46. Virginia has consistently stated that zoning solely for aesthetic reasons is not a valid
exercise of the police power in this state. See Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 64,
168 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1969); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-83,
192 S.E. 881, 885-86 (1937). While this is still the majority view in most jurisdictions, a
growing minority hold ordinances based on aesthetics may be valid. See generally, Annot.,
21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968). For a general survey of zoning and aesthetics see Note, Beyond the
Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973).
47. The county argued that other grounds for applying the police power were found in VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975), which authorizes certain counties, including
James City, to adopt ordinances setting forth the historical landmarks within the county and
to create one or more historical districts in which no building can be built unless architectur-
ally compatible with the historic landmark. The court found that this statute did not apply
since there was no designated landmark within one quarter mile of the B-2 district, and the
ordinance requires architecture distinct from rather than compatible with Colonial Williams-
burg. 216 Va. at 145-46, 216 S.E.2d at 213-14.
48. Other jurisdictions have, however, recognized the validity of architectural design re-
strictions. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1397 (1972).
[Vol. 10:440
1976] RECENT DECISIONS 447
Virginia refused, however, to join the growing number of jurisdictions
which have expanded this presumption to include classifications based
solely on aesthetics. 9 Likewise, if an arbitrary basis can be shown for
exclusion of similar use forms, the presumption will be rebutted. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court of Virginia will permit local govern-
ments to require mandatory dedications as conditions precedent to land
development if the landowner is a subdivider and the subdivision generates
a need for such a public dedication. But, it appears from this decision that
Virginia will not allow great expansion of local zoning power in controlling
certain aspects of land use. The court will remain protective of the rights
of the private landowner when they conflict with expanding governmental
control of growth and development.
R.H. M.
49. See note 46 supra.

